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COMMENTS
INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE AND INDEPENDENT LEGAL
SIGNIFICANCE IN THE NEW YORK LAW OF WILLS
In the substantive law of wills two theories of law are traditionally relied
upon to permit consideration of extrinsic documents in the construction or
expansion of a will. These two theories are the common law doctrines of incor-
poration by reference and independent legal significance. It is the purpose of
this comment to analyze these theories of law in a dual aspect, first, to define
the doctrines, applying them to their logical legal conclusions, and second, to
assess the validity of various writings under existing New Yorl: law.
Tau CommoN LAw Docwrnmrs
It was not until the enactment of Section 21 of the Decedent Estate Law
in 1328,1 providing for the requirement of due execution of a will,2 that prob-
lems relating to the effect of extrinsic documents upon a will were encountered.
Only with the enactment of a statute requiring the formalities of subscription
and attestation do considerations of incorporation by reference and independent
legal significance become pertinent.
Ixorporation by Reference
Basically, incorporation by reference is a judicial deice employed to enlarge
the written content of a validly executed will. 4 The result is that the docu-
ment incorporated takes effect as part of the dispositive provisions, as fully
as if it had been set forth within the actual four corners of the will. The ex-
traneous document is therefore probated with the wllV
The generally recognized requirements for the incorporation of a writing,
not executed according to the statutory requirements, are: (1) the document
to be incorporated must be in existence at the time of the execution of the willU
1. 2 N.Y. Rev. Stat., ch. VI, § 40, at 63 (1329), currently N.Y. Deced. Est. Law § 21.
2. The present New York rule for due execution requires: (1) subscription by the
testator at the end of the will; (2) subscription made by the tetator in the pre=:ncu of
each of the attesting witnesses or acknowledged by him to have been so made to each
of the witnesses; (3) at the time of the subscription, or at the time of acimowlvAd-ing
the same, a declaration by the testator that the instrument so subscribed is his will; and
(4) two attesting witnesses, each of whom must sign at the end of the will at the tez.ta-
tor's request. N.Y. Deced. Est. Law § 21.
3. But see Jackson v. Babcock, 12 Johns. R. 33 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1315), where a
question of incorporation was raised and the court held that a will may be construed In
connection with an instrument to which it refers.
4. The majority of states adhere to the doctrine of incorporation by reference. Se
2 Page, Wills § 19.17 (Bowe-Parker rev. 1960).
S. In re Dimmitt, 141 Neb. 413, 3 N.W.2d 752 (1942); Drelsbach Estate, 3-4 Pa. 535,
121 A.2d 74 (1956); Merrill v. Boal, 47 RI. 274, 132 At. 721 (1926). But see In the
Matter of Willey, 123 Cal. 1, 60 Pac. 471 (1900).
6. See, e.g., Estate of McNamara, 119 Cal. App. 2d 744, 2M0 P2d 182 (Dist. CL App.
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(2) it must be identified by clear and satisfactory proof as the writing referred
to by the reference in the will,7 and (3) there must be a manifested intention
on the part of the testator to incorporate the document. There is disagreement
as to whether or not the intention must be expressly declared.8
After the enactment of the due execution provision of the Decedent Estate
Law in 1828, New .York cases permitted incorporation by reference., Booth
v. Baptist Church,'° however, reversed the earlier cases for no apparent reason,
and with even less authority to substantiate it. In the Booth case, the testator
bequeathed stock to be selected from his securities in accordance with a memo-
randum located among his papers. The court found the memorandum to be
testamentary in character and declared that "it is unquestionably the law of
this state that an unattested paper which is of a testamentary nature cannot
be taken as a part of the will even though referred to by that instrument.""1
To support this reasoning, the court cited three cases, none of which stood for
the proposition advanced. 12 The Booth ruling on the doctrine of incorporation
by reference, though now accepted as a holding, was very probably a dictum
since there was no proof that the memorandum involved was in existence at
the time of the will. 13
A trilogy of New York cases, however, plays havoc with any absolute rule
derivable from the Booth case. In In the Matter of Pilard,14 decided three
1953); Wagner v. Clauson, 399 Ill. 403, 78 N.E.2d 203 (1948); Jordan v. Virginia
Military Institute, 296 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956); Lawless v. Lawless, 187 Va.
511, 47 S.E.2d 431 (1948).
7. 2 Page, Wills § 19.18 (Bowe-Parker rev. 1960).
8. The usual situation is where the testator expressly states that he "hereby incor-
porates said document into the will." Where no such statement is found in the will, the
question of intention is doubtful. See Dobie, Testamentary Incorporation by Reference,
3 Va. L. Rev. 583 (1916). It is sometimes stated as an additional requirement that the
reference must expressly refer to the writing as being in existence. This requirement, how-
ever, would appear to be only a further refinement of the others. See Note, 17 Minn. L.
Rev. 527 (1933).
9. Caulfield v. Sullivan, 85 N.Y. 153 (1881); Tonnele v. Hall, 4 N.Y. 140 (1850);
In the Matter of Storms, 3 Redfield's R. 327 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1878); Wood v. Vanden-
burgh, 6 Paige Ch. R. 277 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1837).
10. 126 N.Y. 215, 28 N.E. 238 (1891).
11. Id. at 247-48, 28 N.E. at 242.
12. The cases were: In the Matter of O'Neil, 91 N.Y. 516 (1883) (decided on subserip.
tion at the end of will, not on incorporation); Williams v. Freeman, 83 N.Y. 561 (1881)
(involved parol declarations); Langdon v. Astor's Ex'rs, 16 N.Y. 9 (1857) (independent
significance).
13. 126 N.Y. at 247, 28 N.E. at 242. It might further be argued that no intent to
incorporate was present. See note 8 supra. Yet, even in view of the unsubstantial nature
of the Booth case, it remains the leading case in New York for the proposition that
incorporation by reference is not gefierally recognized. See, e.g., In the Matter of Brown,
6 Misc. 2d 803, 160 N.Y.S.2d 761 (Surr. Ct. 1957); In re Snyder, 125 N.Y.S.2d 459
(Surr. Ct. 1953); In re Tobin, 113 N.Y.S.2d 831 (Surr. Ct. 1952); In re Leldemer, 113
N.Y.S.2d 808 (Surr. Ct. 1952); In the Matter of Menken, 180 Misc. 656, 44 N.Y.S.2d
164 (Surr. Ct. 1943); In re Welcke, 33 N.Y.S.2d 735 (Surr. Ct. 1942).
14. 111 N.Y. 410, 18 N.E. 718 (1888).
years prior to Booth, a father directed in his will that his daughters, in the
event that they should die during his lifetime, should have the power by their
wills, theretofore or thereafter executed, to dispose of the shares of his estate
gven them by his will. One of the daughters died testate during the father's
lifetime. The father thereafter executed codicils to his will, wherein he re-
affirmed his will and the disposition to his daughter. The court held that the
daughter's executors took under the father's will, saying that "her will, there-
fore, is referred to, not as transferring the property . . . but to define and
make certain the persons to whom and the proportions in which the one-fifth
should pass by the father's will in case of the death of the daughter in his
lifetime."' 5 It seems that this language is insufficient to sustain the doctrine
of incorporation by reference since the court never did consider the time factor.
If the daughter's will were not an existing instrument at the time of execution
of the father's will, an essential requirement for incorporation was lacking.
The theory of incorporation, however, could have been applied because the
father's codicils republished his will as of the time of their execution. At that
time, the will of the daughter was in existence. This reasoning has been ac-
cepted in other jurisdictions.10
The second case in the trilogy is In the Matter of Fawles.17 There the
testator bequeathed half his estate, to be disposed of pursuant to the will of
his wife. His will further provided that if it could not be determined which one
predeceased the other, he would be deemed to have predeceased his wife. Both
perished in a common disaster and it was impossible to tell which one pre-
deceased the other. Both had executed their wills simultaneously. In her will,
however, the wife had exercised the power given by her husband's will. Chief
judge Cardozo, speaking for the majority of the court of appeals, stated that
the doctrine of incorporation by reference was not accepted in New York. He
ruled, however, that there was not, on the facts before the court, any oppor-
tunity for fraud or mistake and that, therefore, there was no reason why the
testator's directive should not be given effect. Here again, as in Piffard, the
facts do not sustain incorporation by reference. The court did not attempt to
fit the facts of the case into the doctrine of incorporation. The vital requirement
that the document incorporated be in existence at the time of the drawing of
the will was not even discussed by the court.
Since the Fowles and Piffard cases dealt with references to wills presumably
duly executed in accordance with the statutory requirements, as a matter of
pure theory, the doctrine of incorporation should not be pertinent. The doc-
trine applies strictly to unattested documents.' 8
15. Id. at 415, 13 N.E. at 719.
16. Simon v. Grayson, 15 Cal. 2d 531, 102 P.2d 1031 (1940); Shaw v. Camp, 163 IIL
144, 45 N.E. 211, (1S96).
17. 222 N.Y. 222, 118 N.E. 611 (191S).
13. It might further he suggested that with respect to the wills of third perons, since
the possibility of fraud is virtually nonexistent, the requirements of incorporation zhould
be proportionately relaxed. See generally Samuels, Incorporation by Reference in Ncw
York Wills, 19 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 270, 291 (1942).
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Still later, however, the court decided In the Matter of Rausch, which is said
to stand for the proposition that New York recognizes incorporation to a limited
extent.19 There the testator bequeathed a part of the residuary estate in trust
for the benefit of his daughter "under the same terms and conditions embodied
in the Trust Agreement made between myself and the said New York Trust
Company .... ,,2o The will contained words expressly incorporating the
existing trust agreement. The bequest of the inter vivos trust was upheld by
the court, but the reasoning was not at all clear. It is evident from the facts
of the case that the requirements of incorporation were satisfied. The trust was
in existence at the time of the will, it was clearly referable as the trust to be
incorporated, and there was an express intention to incorporate it. Yet, some
commentators doubt that the decision was based on incorporation. 21 The court
observed that quite often it is necessary to resort to factors extrinsic to the
four corners of the will. "Here the extrinsic fact, identifying and explaining the
gift already made, is as impersonal and enduring as the inscription on a monu-
ment."'22 To this extent, it is clear that the court was thinking in terms of
independent significance. On the other hand, in comparing the facts of the case
with Hatheway v. Smith,23 and distinguishing the latter on the ground that
Hatheway's will and trust were executed simultaneously, the court was con-
cerned with the time element, which is pertinent only in incorporation.
These three leading cases leave a strong doubt as to whether New York does
in reality adhere to the common law doctrine of incorporation even where inter
vivos trusts or wills are involved. Each of the cases is sustainable on some
other ground and the alternative ground explains the case more adequately.
Each is within the purview of the concept of independent legal significance. "
Independent Legal Significance
Incorporation by reference, as a legal fiction, is relied upon only when the
writing under consideration is testamentary in nature.23 If a writing is found
to be nontestamentary, the necessity for fulfilling the requirements for incor-
19. 258 N.y. 327, 179 N.E. 755 (1932).
20. Id. at 330, 179 N.E. at 756.
21. Note, 6 U. Cinc. L. Rev. 295 (1932); Note, 32 Colum. L. Rev. 917 (1932); Note,
21 Cornell L.Q. 492 (1936); 1 Scott, Trusts § 54.3 (2d ed. 1956).
22. In the Matter of Rausch, 258 N.Y. 327, 332, 179 N.E. 755, 756 (1932).
23. 79 Conn. 506, 65 Ati. 1058 (1907). Connecticut is generally considered the most
stringent state in its position against incorporation. See 1 Page, Wills § 252 (3d ed.
1941); Comment, 27 Miss. L.J. 220 (1956). The law in that state, however, was 're-
cently changed to provide for incorporation by reference of trusts under certain condi-
tions. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45-81 (1958).
24. It is to be observed that a particular case can present facts which can fulfill the
requirements for the operation of both doctrines. See N.Y. Law Revision Comm'n Rep.
431, 440-41 (1935).
25. This is not to say, however, that a nontestamentary document cannot be Incor-
porated into a will. See Pickering v. Young, 282 Mass. 292, 184 N.E. 727 (1933);
Alday v. Cage, 148 S.W. 838 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912). If it in fact is testamentary, then
the only approach available is the theory of incorporation.
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poration is not encountered. A nontestamentary paper is not incorporated into
the will but rather it is used merely to identify or ascertain the legacy, the
amount of the legacy, or the beneficiary.
Hence, in a jurisdiction such as New York, where incorporation is not favored,
it becomes imperative to determine whether or not a writing is testamentary.
The distinction is often difficult. G Mlost acts of an individual performed dur-
ing his lifetime are not testamentary in nature, but ultimately they may have
an effect upon his will. They may affect the beneficiaries or may determine
what is to be taken by a particular beneficiary. Thus, for example, the will
may make a bequest to the one taking care of the testator at his death,27 or
it may bequeath the contents of a room or a house.- In these situations, resort
must be had to some extraneous fact in order to fulfill the bequest, and yet
the will is not invalid. When the testator employs a servant to care for him,
he does not hire the servant for the purpose of making him the legatee under
his will. The act of hiring is nontestamentary. If the testator removes an ar-
ticle of furniture from his house because it is old and worn, clearly it is not
a testamentary act. In each of these situations, however, the testator is in
reality altering his will without the formality of a duly executed codicil. Athin-
son observes, however, that "if the act referred to is palpably specified for the
purpose of allowing subsequent control through unattested act and has no other
real significance, the gift is invalid. '" The act, consequently, must have sig-
nificance independent of the will, i.e., it must have meaning when viewed by
itself, and not be understandable only when read with the will. In a situation
where bequests are made to those listed on a slip of paper in the testator's safe,
the slip of paper has no meaning by itself. Its meaning is completely dependent
upon the will.
Under this doctrine, the independent fact can exist at, before, or after the
execution of the will. There is no time factor involved, as there is with incor-
poration.30 Furthermore, the independent act does not have to be within the
control of the testator.31
Little difficulty is encountered in the cases where the sole factor of inde-
pendent significance is an act. When writings are involved, the case becomes
more difficult since the writing may come very close to being dispositive in
nature. Thus, for example, if the will devises all the testator's property to the
person in his employ at his death, and that person is to possess a writing as
evidence of his employment, what is the effect of the writing? Is it testa-
26. See generally Evans, Incorporation by Reference, Integration, and Non-Teta-
mentary Act, 25 Colun. L. Rev. S79 (1925); Note, 27 Ky. L.J. 431 (1939).
27. Dennis v. Holsapple, 143 Ind. 297, 47 N.E. 631 (1S97); Lear v. Masuer, 114 le.
342, 96 At. 240 (1916); Glasgow's Estate, 243 Pa. 613, 090 Adl. 332 (1914).
2S. Buchwald v. Buchwald, 175 Md. 103, 199 At. 795 (193S); Appeal of Magoohan,
117 Pa. 233, 14 At. 316 (13S7).
29. Atkinson, Mlls § 81 (2d ed. 1953). See also In the Matter of Angle. 147 Misc.
445, 264 N.Y. Supp. 29 (Surr. Ct. 1933).




mentary or not? The rule applicable to this situation would hold that for
independent significance to apply, the act must be the salient feature and the
writing only incidental.
In the early case of Langdon v. Astor's Ex'rs,32 the will provided that if
any inter vivos gifts were charged on the testator's books of account against
any of the beneficiaries named in his will, then their respective legacies should
be reduced proportionately. The court allowed the reduction in the bequests
as evidenced on the books. The fact of the gifts was the relevant consideration;
the notations in the book only secondary. On this basis, it can be argued
that the fact of an existing will or inter vivos trust is the primary considera-
tion and the writing is only secondary, and merely evidence of the fact. But
the New York cases do not proceed on that theory, at least not expressly.
They do in fact apply the theory, but speak in terms of incorporation by
reference. 33 Again, referring to the three leading New York cases, 4 it is ap-
parent that independent legal significance is sustainable in each of them.
Clearly, the will of another has an existence independent of the will of the
testator attempting the incorporation. For the testator, it is only evidence
of the beneficiaries who are to take under his will, although testamentary in
relation to the individual who executed it. It is equally apparent that an
inter vivos trust has independent significance. The establishment of such a
trust is not testamentary in character. Thus, Piffard, Fowles, and Rausch
are sustainable without resort to incorporation by reference, if the existence
of the fact, will, or trust is paramount to the writings which created them.
The New York Rule
It has been suggested that New York recognizes incorporation when there
is some ground to uphold it, i.e., independent legal significance.3 5 As a techni-
cal result, this would mean that although the document is actually referred
to as one of independent significance, it, in effect, becomes part of the will
as if it were incorporated by reference. The distinction is merely one of form
because it makes little difference whether the document is only referred to or
actually made part of the will, so long as the intention of the testator is
fulfilled.
It is reasonable to conclude that there is no rule of incorporation operative
in New York, but only the rule of independent significance, which permits
inclusion of the writing referred to for the purpose of probate.8 0
32. 16 N.Y. 9 (1857). The New York cases give full adherence to independent legal
significance when an act alone is involved. See Givens v. Whitney, 233 N.Y. 665, 135
N.E. 961 (1922) (per curiam); Harrington v. Abberton, 115 App. Div. 177, 100 N.Y.
Supp. 681 (1st Dep't 1906); Matter of Altman, 115 Misc. 476, 188 N.Y. Supp. 493 (Surr.
Ct. 1921); Matter of Mitchell, 114 Misc. 370, 186 N.Y. Supp. 666 (Surr. Ct. 1921).
33. Samuels, op. cit. supra note 18,*at 290-92.
34. In the Matter of Rausch, 258 N.Y. 327, 179 N.E. 755 (1932); In the Matter of
Fowles, 222 N.Y. 222, 118 N.E. 611 (1918); In the Matter of Piffard, 111 N.Y. 410, 18
N.E. 718 (1888).
35. Samuels, op. cit. supra note 18, at 290-92.
36. Thus, in Rausch, 258 N.Y. 327, 179 N.E. 755 (1932), the trust agreement was
[Vol. 29
INCORPORATION OF VAIous Docun.zI.%s
Trust Agreements
Under the authority of Ra?,sch,z7 an unamendable and irrevocable inter
vivos trust instrument referred to by a will may be incorporated therein. If
Rausch is a case of independent significance, then it should not make any
difference whether the trust comes into existence before or after the vill as
long as it is operative before the testator dies.3s In re Snydcr held that, even
though the inter vivos trust was amendable, a testamentary bequest to the
trustee was valid because the trust had not in fact been amended since the
execution of the will.
On the question of an amendment to the inter vivos trust subsequent to
the execution of the will, there is a divergence of holdings in the various
states.40 In President and Directors of Manhattan Co. v. Janowitz,41 the
testator modified the trust subsequent to the execution of the vill. The ap-
pellate division held that the provisions of the will leaving the bequest to the
trustee were wholly invalid. The court found that the bequest could not be
upheld upon either the theory of incorporation or of independent significance.
It distinguished the case from Rausch on the ground that the Rausch trust
was unamendable and irrevocable. It is interesting to note that, in view of
the judicial reliance upon the alleged fact that the Rausch trust was un-
amendable, the trust did in fact provide for a conditional amendment.42
The court in the Janowitz case went on to say that "the reservation of
power to amend the trust indenture and its repeated exercise eliminated all
independent significance that might be attached to the trust indenture.,"13
This reasoning would seem to misconstrue the theory of independent signifi-
cance, since the ability to change the instrument has no relevancy if it is
nontestamentary. The holding in the Janowitz case, however, has been modi-
fied to an extent by In the Matter of 1vie.44 In the latter case, the trust, sub-
sequent to the execution of the will, was amended so as to eliminate the
incorporated into the will, not because it fulfilled the requirements of incorporation but
rather because it was a factor of independent significance and there was e.prc:usd an
intent to include it in the will. When it is observed that much written in wills is not
truly testamentary, yet probated with the vAill, such a position is not [o Etartling.
37. Ibid.
3S. If the trust were not operative at the testator's death, its es-tence as a fact
would be illusory.
39. 125 N.Y.S.2d 459 (Surr. CL 1953).
40. Atwood v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 275 Fed. 513 (Met Cir. 1921) (the
trust failed); Old Colony Trust Co. v. Cleveland, 291 Mass. 3SO, 196 N.E. 920 (1935)
(trust disposed of in accordance with the .ay it exizsted at the time of the maildg of the
will). See also Koeninger v. Toledo Trust Co., 49 Ohio App. 490, 197 N.E. 419 (1934);
1 Scott, Trusts § 54.3 (2d ed. 1956).
41. 260 App. Div. 174, 21 N.Y.S.2d 232 (2d Dep't 1940).
42. In the Matter of Rausch, 143 Alisc. 101, 102-03, 257 N.Y. Supp. 7S, 79 (Surr. Ct.
1930).
43. 260 App. Div. at 179, 21 N.Y.S.2d at 237.
44. 4 N.Y.2d 17S, 149 N.E.2d 725, 173 N.YS.2d 293 (1953).
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settlor's power to amend or alter the trust. The court found that the fact
of minor administrative changes after the execution of the will did not offend
the rule of "incorporation by reference." This observation clearly shows the
extent of the confusion in New York. Strictly speaking, any type of change
in the writing to be incorporated defeats incorporation. Consequently, Ivie
is inconsistent with incorporation. If, on the other hand, the theory is inde-
pendent significance, then there is no need to distinguish the nature of the
change, so long as it is not testamentary. With independent significance, the
testator always retains the power to change substantially his bequests or bene-
ficiaries by altering the independent factor.
Unattested Memoranda
Unattested memoranda cannot be incorporated in New York in the sense
of being probated with the will. They may, however, be referred to in order
to clarify bequests or beneficiaries, if they are nontestamentary, under the
theory of independent significance. The difficulty here is to show that the
memorandum is not testamentary in character. It is suggested that such a
determination is quite often a question of semantics.
In In the Matter of Le Collen,45 the testatrix bequeathed the contents of
certain envelopes in her safe deposit box to the persons named thereon, and
then named the beneficiaries, but not the specific securities given each. The
court upheld the bequest, stating that "a nontestamentary extraneous paper
may be resorted . .. to .. . for the limited purpose of identifying the thing
intended to be given."4 6 The case could be considered a receptacle case of
independent significance, if the bequest had been "all my securities in my
safe deposit box I give to Smith." The fact of the writing on the envelopes,
however, brings the case under scrutiny in order to determine the weight to
be given the writing. Conceivably, the envelope itself may be looked upon as
a receptacle. It is logical also to say that the names on the envelope are
identical with the means of identification such as "the green envelope." In
the typical receptacle case, the fact that the testator gives all the personalty
in his house to a beneficiary does not defeat the bequest simply because it is
necessary to read the house address to determine the correct house. It is to
be observed, however, that if the testatrix had failed to name the beneficiaries
in her will, the bequests would have failed since, then, the names on the
envelopes would be testamentary in character and have significance only in
relation to the will.
On the other hand, the court stated that the rule against incorporation of
unattested memoranda, testamentary in nature, "is applicable whether the in-
strument is required to be resorted to to identify the beneficiary or the quantum
of his benefit. '47 Cannot the envelope with the beneficiary's name on it be
said to identify the quantum of the benefit? The distinction is, indeed, elusive
and Chief Judge Cardozo pinpointed that elusiveness when he stated that "the
45. 190 Misc. 272, 72 N.Y.S.2d 467 (Surr. Ct. 1947).
46. Id. at 275, 72 N.Y.S.2d at 470.
47. Ibid.
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two classes of cases run into each other by almost imperceptible gradations. " 3
A New York case illustrating this imperceptible gradation is In the Matter
of Gibbons,49 wherein the court invalidated a provision in a will to pay the
outstanding checks of the testator at his death. The court did not treat the
case as one of independent significance but it clearly is such. The fact of the
money owing or the purported gift is the primary factor; the check is merely
evidence.
Essentially, it should not make any difference what the writing contains,
i.e., whether it identifies the beneficiary, the bequest, or the amount, so long
as its significance is not solely dependent upon the will.
Wills
Where it is necessary to refer to the will of another to determine the bene-
ficiaries or the quantum of the estate, such reference is valid in New York and
sustainable by independent significance. 0
CONCLUSION
It has been suggested that New York's approach is empirical, taking each
case on its facts.5' Obviously, such a rule is no rule of law but a question of
fact. A clear judicial statement that New York is in full accord with inde-
pendent significance is necessary for clarification. If independent significance
can be accepted in New York, there is no sound reason for not accepting
incorporation by reference. Both serve an equitable purpose and both possess
adequate safeguards. A rule of law founded upon a dictum in a case where
the rule was not applicable to the facts, and substantiated by three cases
which do not support the contention advanced, speaks for itself.Z2
It is submitted that the New, York courts should have more regard for
the words of Chief Judge Cardozo, that the primary consideration is to pre-
vent "fraud and mistake. ' 3
48. In the Matter of Rausch, 25S N Y. 327, 332, 179 N.E. 755, 756 (1932), quoting In
the Mlatter of Fow-les, 222 N.Y. 222, 233, 113 N.E. 611, 613 (191S).
49. 234 App. Div. 153, 254 N.Y.S. 566 (3d Dep't 1931).
50. In the Matter of Fowlez, 222 N.Y. 222, IlS N.E. 611 (1913); In the Mattcr of
Piffard, 111 N.Y. 410, 13 N.E. 713 (1SSS).
51. Samuels, op. dt. supra note IS, at 290-92.
52. See notes 10 and 12 supra.
53. In the Matter of Fowles, 222 N.Y. 222, 232, 113 N.E. 611, 613 (1913).
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